In January, 2002 then President of the United States, George W. Bush, referred to three countries as an "Axis of Evil": Iraq, Iran and North Korea. In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein.
In 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb, Pyongyang’s desire for nuclear power steaming from “ingrained insecurity vis-à-vis the United States” (Lee), or, the threat the US possesses to North Korean security. Thus, in theory, if the US were to guarantee security, and in essence, to not attack the Korean island, one would assume that North Korea could be denuclearized. However, in 2009 the North detonated a second nuclear device and since has launched a sustained attack on an island of U.S. ally: South Korea, reportedly attacking and sinking a South Korean ship. There has been no military response to the North's actions. The 2009 test was not only a display of nuclear power, but also another reminder to the United States, playing on the nations fear of a nuclear competitor. Nonetheless China, who is not only North Koreas partner but also a “major supplier of such basic needs as food and energy,”(Roy) was angered by such testing. One can safely assume that “fear of aggression by the United States and its allies is a principal driver of North Korean foreign policy,” (Roy) nevertheless; Pyongyang continuously supplies reason for American aggression.
Thus, I ask the following question: What lessons might have Iran taken from the recent history of the other "Axis" countries? Considering a Realist lens, should Iran develop its nuclear program?
I have chosen to answer this question through the Morgenthau perspective, which states that, “a tragic perspective enables us to confront more squarely the harsh realities of politics, the evil aspects of human nature, and the ethical compromises action requires.” (Klusmeyer)
When first considering these questions, I could not help but think of Raison d’état – the term Raison d’état roughly translates to national interest and is used to explain the actions of states in the international system. Personally, I believe that North Korea acted on the basis of Raison d’état through the ideals of Morgenthau’s works, as did the United States in regards to Iraq.
Thucydides Melian Dialogue acts as a perfect analogy and parallel to the dynamic between these four countries. In the dialogue, the Athenians wish to conquer the Island of Melos, to threaten and impose fear on Sparta. In essence, the Athenians offer to the Melians an ultimatum: surrender or be destroyed. The Melians argue that they are a neutral country and should not be attacked. The Athenians then explain that not attacking Melos would make them in turn look weak. The dialogue continues, and explores the morality of destroying Melos.
The US began by taking the role of the Athenians, treating Iraq as a Melian, just as in the dialogue, attacking them and ultimately taking over as a show of strength, power and oppressive ideals. North Korea, seeing this, acted upon Raison d’état and adopted #4 of Morgenthau’s Essential Assumptions of Political Realism: States, above all else, are concerned with their security. Instead of letting the US get to them first, North Korea decided to advance and consolidate their respect.
Although I do not support North Korea, by waiting it out and working with self-interest and survival they insured themselves a position as a potential threat, and one that cannot be easily defeated.
Thus, if Iran were to approach and adopt Morgenthau’s plan, their first plan of action would be to also develop nuclear weapons, as to not be the only ‘axis of evil’ to not have a way to defend itself. By developing nuclear weapons, a country is able to inherit both respect and power, two things Iran needs if they wish to get ahead as a state. This would ensure power on an international scale, and hopefully generate enough fear for things to work.
However, one must also look at the implications of Realism, and the negative affects nuclear weapons could have on Iran, specifically in regard to its security. Israel, the only Middle Eastern nation that possesses nuclear weapons, would see Iran’s possession as a threat. “It is clear from statements of Israeli military and intelligence officials and numerous press leaks that planning for a military operation to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is well under way in Israel” (Riedel). If Israel were to attack Iran, one could assume that the United States, an ally of Israel, would seize the opportunity to join the attacks – a war Iran would loose.
From a Realist perspective, although Iran would face major negative implications if it were to develop its nuclear program, it faces the larger risk of being a target if it does not. By becoming a nuclear competitor, Iran will not only rise to the level of countries like Israel and the United States, but it will not longer be the threatened. Thus, it is in Iran’s best interest to learn from North Korea’s actions, and protect itself; survival of the fittest style.
LEE Chung, Min. "Nuclear Sisyphus: the myth of denuclearizing North Korea." Australian Journal of International Affairs 61.1 (2007): 15-22. International Political Science Abstracts. EBSCO. Web. 21 Sept. 2011.
KLUSMEYER, Douglas. "Beyond tragedy: Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on responsibility, evil and political ethics." International Studies Review 11.2 (2009): 332-351. International Political Science Abstracts. EBSCO. Web. 21 Sept. 2011.
RIEDEL, Bruce. "If Israel attacks [Iran]." National Interest 109.(2010): 6-13. International Political Science Abstracts. EBSCO. Web. 22 Sept. 2011.
ROY, Denny. "Parsing Pyongyang's [North Korea’s] strategy." Survival 52.1 (2010): 111-136. International Political Science Abstracts. EBSCO. Web. 21 Sept. 2011.
